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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s, Americans have wrestled with whether and how
to implement affirmative action initiatives to equalize economic and
educational opportunities for members of minority groups. The role
of affirmative action in higher education is central to this debate. The
late historian Hugh Davis Graham identified two types of affirmative
action-one "soft" and the other "hard."1 Under "soft" affirmative ac-
tion, he placed the aggressive outreach, pressure, and lobbying tactics
pursued by the Kennedy andjohnson administrations.2 Under "hard"
affirmative action, Graham placed minority preferences, court-or-
dered set asides, and hiring quotas." Both types of affirmative action
t Marcia G. Synnott earned her A.B. at Radcliffe College (1961), M.A. at Brown Uni-
versity (1964), and Ph.D. at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst (1974). A Professor
of History at the University of South Carolina, where she has taught since 1972, she special-
izes in twentieth-century United States History, Higher Education, and the History of
American Women.
I See Hugh Davis Graham, Civil Rights Policy in the Carter Presidency, in THE CARTER
PRESIDENCY: POLICY CHOICES IN THE POST NEW DEAL ERA 217-18 (Gary M. Fink & Hugh
Davis Graham eds., 1998).
2 See id. at 204, 217.
3 See id. at 217-18.
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have been used in minority recruitment programs for businesses and
universities.4 But nonminority groups, specifically white males, have
sharply criticized affirmative action programs as discriminatory. 5 As a
result of these challenges, the Supreme Court has reviewed the consti-
tutionality of affirmative action programs in higher education admis-
sions in three pivotal cases: Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,6 Grutter v. Bollinger,7 and Gratz v. Bollinger." Bakke provides the
historical and judicial context for understanding the significance of
Grutter, which upheld the admissions program at the University of
Michigan Law School, and Gratz, which struck down the undergradu-
ate admissions program at the University of Michigan's College of
Literature, Science, and the Arts.
In all three cases, Ivy League and other selective institutions sub-
mitted amici curiae briefs defending the "diversity rationale."9 The
amicus brief submitted by Harvard and three other highly selective
private universities10 won a razor-thin victory in Bakke." In 2002,
Harvard again led a coalition of top universities 12 in submitting a brief
in support of the University of Michigan's affirmative action admis-
sions policies. 13 A large number of other colleges and universities also
submitted amici curiae briefs supporting the University of Michigan.
14
In Grutter, the Court, in a 5-4 ruling, upheld the use of race as a factor
in individual, holistically-based admissions decisions far more deci-
4 See id.
5 See, e.g., Richmond v.J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (reviewing a statute that
required prime contractors awarded city construction contracts to subcontract at least 30%
of the dollar amount of each contract to minority businesses); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448 (1980) (reviewing a statute that required at least 10% of federal funds granted for
local public works projects to go to minority businesses); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932
(5th Cir. 1996) (reviewing a university admissions plan designed to admit a class comprised
of 10% Mexican-American students and 5% black students), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033
(1996).
6 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
7 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
8 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
9 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Harvard University et al. at 8, Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter Harvard Brief] ("Selective universities
across the country have built their communities mindful of the pedagogical value of multi-
racial diversity in educational programs."), at http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/
daily/0302/pdfs/amicus-harvard. pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
10 Brief of Amici Curiae Columbia University et al., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811) [hereinafter Columbia Brief in Bakke].
S1I See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314-24 (1978) (discussing
and citing the amici brief submitted by Columbia University and finding that "the interest
of diversity is compelling in the context of a university's admissions program").
12 In addition to Harvard, supporters of the brief included five other Ivy League insti-
tutions, the University of Chicago, and Duke University. Harvard Brief, supra note 9, at i.
13 See id.
14 See Briefs Filed in Support of the University of Michigan [hereinafter Amicus Briefs
Summary], at http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/gru-amicus-ussc/sum-
mary.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
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sively than it had in Bakke.15 Yet, in Gratz, the companion case to Grut-
ter, the Court struck down Michigan's undergraduate admissions
system of awarding extra points to minority applicants, finding that
this system was too mechanistic.' 6
The diversity rationale that evolved in university admissions from
the Bakke decision to the University of Michigan cases casts light on
how Americans considered and adopted ways of bringing into the
higher educational mainstream groups formerly marginalized or ex-
cluded on the basis of ethnicity and race. Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke (examined in Part I), which supported the use of race as one
legitimate factor in admissions, opened the way for the expansion of
college and university affirmative action programs. Divisions among
the Justices, however, made subsequent lawsuits almost certain be-
cause of the tug of war that emerged between whites and racial minor-
ities for admission to the most competitive private and public
universities. A study of Harvard undergraduate admissions policies,
discussed in Part II, reveals how one of the most prestigious private
universities balanced the competing claims of the traditional white
male clientele against Harvard's recognition that it must become
open to a diversity of cultures, talents, and viewpoints.
The use of racial preferences in admissions came under sharp
attack by the 1990s, especially after the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled in Hopwood that the affirmative action program at the University
of Texas Law School violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal pro-
tection clause.17 This decision is discussed in Part III. Given Hop-
woods challenge to Bakke, it was inevitable that the United States
Supreme Court would eventually have to reconsider the legitimacy of
Justice Powell's diversity rationale. Two cases challenging affirmative
action at the University of Michigan, examined in Part IV, provided
the Supreme Court that opportunity. The judicial outcome would
have a nationwide impact on affirmative action in college admissions.
To win its fight, the University of Michigan rallied support from an
impressive coalition of universities, corporations, military leaders, and
civil rights groups. In addition to amici curiae briefs, the University of
Michigan recruited expert witnesses, notably William G. Bowen and
15 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) ("In summary, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions
decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow
from a diverse student body.").
16 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) ("We conclude, therefore, that
because the University's use of race in its current freshman admissions policy is not nar-
rowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted compelling interest in diversity, the admis-
sions policy violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
17 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
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Derek Bok, former presidents, respectively, of Princeton and Harvard
universities. Their expert opinions are discussed in Part V.
The Supreme Court split in its University of Michigan decisions.
In a stronger 5-4 holding than in Bakke, Justice O'Connor, writing for
the majority, upheld racial preferences as one factor in admissions to
the University of Michigan Law School. Though the Court rejected
Michigan's point system for minority undergraduates, colleges and
universities generally believed that they had both a road map and a
timetable-of no more than twenty-five years-to implement legiti-
mate affirmative action programs. Nevertheless, those educational in-
stitutions continuing affirmative action are cautiously designing their
programs and seeking ways to broaden the concept of diversity to in-
clude economically disadvantaged students from all cultures and
races. These efforts are discussed in the concluding Part VII.
I
JUSTICE POWEil 'S "DIvERsITY RATIONALE" AND THE IMPACT
OF SPLIT VOTES IN BAKKE
In the late 1970s, civil rights proponents, minority groups, college
and university officials, and President Jimmy Carter's administration
were all deeply concerned that the Supreme Court might affirm the
California Supreme Court's decision barring the use of race in admis-
sions decisions, thereby nullifying affirmative action programs.18 On
June 28, 1978, however, in a 5-4 decision,Justice Powell provided the
critical fifth vote in Bakke to reverse the California Supreme Court's
injunction against the use of race in admissions decisions.1 9 In what
might be termed a politically adroit ruling, both sides of the debate
received concessions. First, the Court ordered the Medical School of
the University of California at Davis (U.C.-Davis) to admit Allan P.
Bakke, a twice-rejected white applicant.2 0 Second, the Court struck
down the medical school's quota system, which held sixteen admis-
18 See, e.g., Steven V. Roberts, Educators Fear a Ruling for Bakke Would Undo Minorities'
Vast Gains, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1977, at Al.
19 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322 ("Justice Powell provided a fifth vote [in Bakke] not only
for invalidating the set-aside program, but also for reversing the state court's injunction
against any use of race whatsoever.").
20 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978). The trial court
agreed with Bakke that reserving sixteen spaces for minorities at U.C.-Davis's medical
school amounted to a racial quota. See Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d
1152, 1156 (Cal. 1976). The trial court, however, did not order the medical school to
admit Bakke because he could not show that he would have been admitted in the absence
of the minority quota. See id. Under a strict scrutiny standard, however, the California
Supreme Court directed that respondent be admitted to the Medical School. Id. at 1172.
California's highest court strongly condemned the use of "racial percentages" as a "thor-
oughly discredited" policy, but allowed U.C.-Davis to use "flexible admission standards"
such as personal interviews, recommendations, character assessment, and professional
goals. Id. at 1171, 1166.
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sions slots especially for minorities, finding such a system unconstitu-
tional under the Equal Protection Clause. 21 Consequently, race could
be used to tip the balance in favor of a minority applicant. 22 Third,
citing the First Amendment's protection of academic freedom, the
Court afforded colleges and universities considerable discretion to de-
sign affirmative action programs modeled on Harvard College's flexi-
ble admissions criteria. 23 Under Powell's "diversity rationale," schools
could include race as a legitimate factor in admissions policies.
2 4
Because five other Justices wrote opinions expressing varying de-
grees of agreement or disagreement with Powell's opinion, many ob-
servers criticized that Bakke was not "a landmark case. '2 5 Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun-known as the "Brennan
bloc"-favored maintaining the minority admissions program at U.C.-
Davis on the grounds that it was a benign racial classification to rem-
edy past discrimination. 26 The Brennan bloc also did not think that
the remedies had to be color-blind to be considered constitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 27 In
addition, Justice Brennan pointed out that there was little difference
between the goals of Harvard's admissions policies and those of the
medical school at U.C.-Davis, except that Harvard's were less public. 28
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, and Stewart-
the "Stevens bloc"-argued that the medical school's program was il-
21 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20; see also The Year of Bakke: Excerpts from Published Corn-
menay, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 3, 1978, at 36 (reprinting newspaper and journal
commentaries published in response to the Bakke decision); Warren Weaver,Jr., High Court
Backs Some Affirmative Action by Colleges, but Orders Bakke Admitted, Victory for a White, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 1978, at A], A22; What the Court Said in Two 5-to-4 Rulings on the Bakke Case,
CHRON. OF HIGHER Enuc., July 3, 1978, at 3-12 (laying out the opinions of Justices Powell,
Brennan, and Stevens in Bakke and printing the reactions of various civil rights activists to
these decisions).
22 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 ("Ethnic diversity is only one element in a range of factors
which a university may properly consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student
body.").
23 See id at 312-13.
24 See id. at 314.
25 See, e.g., ALLAN P. SINDLER, BAKKE, DEFuNs, AND MINOPRITV ADMISSIONS: THE QUEST
FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 318 (1978).
26 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 375-76 (Brennan J., concurring) ("The Davis program does
not simply advance less qualified applicants; rather, it compensates applicants, who it is
uncontested are fully qualified to study medicine, for educational disadvantages which it
was reasonable to conclude were a product of state-fostered discrimination.").
27 See id. at 327 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun,JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
28 See id. at 379 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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legal under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.29 Justices Black-
mun, Marshall, and White also submitted their own opinions.s°
Other commentators praised the opinion. For example, Harvard
Law School professor Alan M. Dershowitz called the Bakke decision
"an act of judicial statesmanship" 31 because it "neither legitimized ra-
cial quotas nor put down affirmative action programs[,]" and because
admissions officers would now have to "look at people as persons, not
as members of a group and not as computerized ciphers. '32 Arnold
Forster, general counsel of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai
B'rith, was "comforted that, once and for all, the United States Su-
preme Court has held that racial quotas are flatly illegal. 3 3 President
Carter praised the Court's "historic decision" for its message that
"properly tailored affirmative action plans ... are consistent with the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and with the Constitution."
34
Nonetheless, members of Carter's administration mirrored the
ambivalence of the Court's 5-4 decision. For example, United States
Attorney General and former Fifth Circuit Judge Griffin Bell, who
publicly praised Powell's opinion as "a great gain for affirmative ac-
tion,"3 5 apparently had reservations, At a 1997 conference at the
Carter Library, Bell commented that Powell had "obfuscated" the
problem. 36 Bell believed that affirmative action programs should
favor only the economic "underclass" in order to encourage their as-
cent into the middle class, stating that "the quicker we move to an
economic test, the better off the nation will be."37 Furthermore, he
felt that dividing the nation into percentages or proportional repre-
sentation would result in "an affirmative action program mainly for
Hispanics in one part of the country and Blacks in another, or one
29 See id. at 408 (Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist,JJ., with Burger, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
30 See id. at 402 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 387
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 378 (White,J, concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
31 Linda Greenhouse, Bell Hails Decision, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1978, at Al.
32 John Herbers, A Plateau for Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1978, at A22.
33 Greenhouse, supra note 31, at Al.
34 Memorandum from President Jimmy Carter, to Heads of Executive Departments
and Agencies (July 20, 1978) (located in the White House Central Files, Box HU-9, file HU
1-1 1/1/78-12/31/78 Executive, Jimmy Carter Library and Presidential Center).
35 Greenhouse, supra note 31, at Al.
36 Griffin Bell, Remarks at Panel on Affirmative Action at the Conference on the
Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post New Deal Era (Feb. 21, 1997); Letter from
Griffin B. Bell, Senior Partner, King & Spalding, Atlanta, Georgia, to Dr. Gary M. Fink
(Feb. 21, 1997) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Bell, Remarks]; see also Marcia G.
Synnott, Regents v. Bakke (1978), the Diversity Rationale, and the Carter Administration
(Feb. 21, 1997) (paper presented at the Conference on The Carter Presidency: Policy
Choices in the Post New Deal Era) (on file with author) (providing a general history of
Bakke and the Carter Administration's reactions to it).
37 Letter from Griffin B. Bell, to Dr. Gary M. Fink (Feb. 21, 1997).
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Rome and one Athens." 38 Because it was "unrealistic ... if not uncon-
stitutional" to presume that minority status equated with discrimina-
tion,39 Bell felt that the Court needed to focus on the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
40
Fourth CircuitJudgeJ. Harvie Wilkinson III, a former law clerk to
Justice Powell, also disapproved of applying benign racial classifica-
tions to remedy past discrimination. Judge Wilkinson took issue with
'Justice Blackmun's paradoxical assertion that 'to get beyond racism,
we must first take account of race"' because it "seems to endorse race-
based means as a first choice, not as an alternative of last resort."
4 1
Further, Wilkinson felt that continuing racial divisions and politiciza-
tion seriously'threatened "the concepts of nationhood and citizen-
ship," presenting a danger "perhaps more serious than any threat the
country has faced since the time of the Civil War. '42 He also felt that
racial separatism contradicted the racially integrated society envi-
sioned by the Supreme Court in the seminal Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion case, 43 which stood "for the premise that race is not the salient
characteristic of an American citizen or even a relevant characteristic
for public decisionmaking at all."44 Although Brown had not brought
about "the ideal society," Wilkinson believed "that the alternative vi-
sions are . . .unbearably grim."
45
II
HARVARD ADMISSIONS POLICIES: A PROBLEMATIC MODEL?
Joel Dreyfuss and Charles Lawrence III astutely predicted that
"[n] one of America's traditional victims would be winners in the Bakke
case."' 46 Instead, the victors were "the country's economically and ed-
ucationally privileged[ ',]47 institutions such as Harvard University,
whose right to select their student body without outside interference
was vehemently defended by alumnus Archibald Cox in his legal argu-
38 See id.
39 Id.
40 See Bell, Remarks, supra note 36.
41 J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Law of Civil Rights and the Dangers of Separatism in Mul-
ticultural America, 47 STAN L. REv. 993, 1013 (1995) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
42 Id. at 1007 ("If the majority cannot truly understand the plight of the minority, or if
the members of one minority culture cannot really pcrceive what it means to belong to
another, then the basic decisions of governance are suspect.").
43 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
44 Wilkinson, supra note 41, at 997-98.
45 Id.; see alsoJ. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM Brown to Bakke. The Supreme Court and
School Integration, 1964-1978 (1979) (discussing Wilkinson's views of the Brown and Bakke
decisions and what they mean for racial integration in the United States).





ments on behalf of the Davis Medical School.48 Justice Powell's diver-
sity rationale, substantially based on the arguments presented in the
amici curiae brief submitted by Columbia, Harvard, Stanford, and
the University of Pennsylvania, 49 proved a boon for the recruitment of
black and other minority students at many of the nation's most pres-
tigious private and flagship state universities.50 In his opinion on legit-
imate affirmative action programs, Justice Powell praised Harvard for
recruiting "not only Californians or Louisianans but also blacks and
Chicanos and other minority students." 5I Although "race and ethnic
background may be deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file ....
it does not insulate the individual from comparison with all other can-
didates for the available seats." 2 Among Harvard's flexible criteria
were "exceptional personal talents, unique work or service experi-
ence, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a his-
tory of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with the
poor, or other qualifications deemed important.
53
While some might question Justice Powell's educational expertise
because he selected "an undergraduate liberal arts college as a model
for medical school admissions," he did so precisely because Harvard's
admissions policy was "so vague and discretionary as to defy descrip-
tion." 54 An admissions officer may not be able to explain what combi-
nation of attributes a successful candidate should possess, "but is
supposed to know a Harvard man (or, more recently, woman) when
he sees one."
55
Justice Powell's use of Harvard College as a model of a constitu-
tional admissions policy was not the best choice for a number of addi-
tional reasons. First, as the nation's oldest and wealthiest university,
Harvard has a unique status in American higher education, drawing
applicants from among the best students of all races.5 6 Second,
48 Id. at 175-89, 228.
49 Columbia Brief in Bakke, supra note 10, at 27-30.
50 See TERRY H. ANDERSON, THE PURSUIT OF FAIRNESS: A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE Ac-
TION 280-81 (2004).
51 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265 (1978).
52 Id. at 317.
53 Id. Harvard and Radcliffe admitted 1,628 men and women in the class of 1982.
There were no established minimums for minority groups. Approximately 307 students, or
18.9 percent, were classified as minority students: 132 blacks constituted 8.1 percent;
ninety-three Asian Americans were 5.7 percent; seventy-five of Hispanic origin were 4.6
percent; and seven Native Americans were just four-tenths of one percent. See Michael
Knight, Hamard Admissions Plan Held Model of Flexibility, N. Y. TIMES, June 29, 1978, at A23.
54 Alan Dershowitz, Powell's Beau Ideal, Could Harvard Itself Pass the Harvard Test?, NEw
REPUBLIC, July 22, 1978, at 14-17.
55 Id.; see also SINDLER, supra note 25, at 268 (stating that the best way to assist minority
groups was through "a combination of race neutrality and affirmative action that stay[s]
well clear of outright preferential treatment").
56 See MARCIA GRAHAM SYNNOTT, THE HALF-OPENED DOOR: DISCRIMINATION AND ADMIS-
SIONS AT HARVARD, YALE, AND PRINCETON, 1900-1970, at 225-31 (1979).
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Harvard can devote considerable resources to admissions decisions
and can plausibly argue that it compares each applicant against every
other applicant from a number of perspectives. Third, Harvard, like
other prestigious universities and leading professional schools, has a
stake in retaining the students it admits. Thus, Harvard provides gen-
erous financial aid packages and mcntoring programs, which it is able
to do because of its exceptional endowment.57 Hence, there is less
risk at Harvard that the students who matriculate are academically ill-
equipped to remain there than exists at less prestigious institutions,
which must compete for qualified black and Hispanic students in na-
tional applicant pools that are smaller than the pools of qualified
white and Asian-American students.
58
Fourth, Harvard's now well-documented history of blatantly anti-
Semitic policies undermines the legitimacy of using Harvard's admis-
sions policies as a model for the promotion of diversity. 59 In May
1939, for example, Julian Lowell Coolidge, master of Lowell House,
complained to PresidentJames Bryant Conant about "the vexing ques-
tion of the number of Jews in Harvard College," who were to be lim-
ited by a gentlemen's agreement to around twelve percent of the
student population. 60 Harvard adhered to a de facto "selective" ad-
missions policy that resulted in a Jewish quota.6 1 When the economy
forced the college to admit an additional one hundred students in
July 1940, in order to reach its freshman class size of 1,100, the Admis-
sions Committee did not admit more Jews, but rather academically
weaker non-Jewish students who could pay their way.62 However, Pres-
ident Conant hoped they would have "at least a fifty-fifty chance of
being promoted to the Sophomore class." 63 Jewish quotas at Harvard,
Yale, Princeton, and other selective private colleges began to soften
57 See Harvard's Endowment Funds, at http://www.hno.harvard.edu/guide/finance/
index.htmI (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
58 Theodore Cross, The Thernstrom Fallacy, Why Affirmative Action Is Not Possible for High
Dropout Rates of African-American College Students, J. BLAcKS HIGHER EDUC., Summer 1998, at
92 tbl., 93; see Stephan Thernstrom, The Black-White Student Mismatch Problem in University
Admissions, J. BLACKs HIGHER EDUC., Winter 1994/1995, at 62, 62-64.
59 See SVN-rOTr, supra note 56, at 85-124 (discussing the admissions policies adopted
at Harvard from 1920-1950 that sifted out Jewish candidates).
60 Letter from Julian L. Coolidge, Master of Lowell House, Harvard College, to James
Bryant Conant, President of Harvard College (May 9, 1939) (on file with Harvard Univer-
sity Archives).
61 See id.
62 l.etter from Richard M. Gummere, Admissions Office, Harvard College, to James B.
Conant, President of Harvard College (July 22, 1940) (on file with the Harvard University
Archives).
63 Letter from James Bryant Conant, President of Harvard College, to Richard M.
Gummere, Admissions Office, Harvard College (July 1, 1940) (on file with Harvard Univer-
sity Archives); see SYNNOTT, supra note 56, at 85-124.
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after World War II, but did not begin to end until the late 1950s.64
Thus, despite the suggested "neutrality" of the Harvard admissions
process, Harvard has a long history of playing the "numbers game."
The care that Harvard puts into selecting a balanced and diversi-
fied freshman class is borne out by the very high graduation rates for
its students, both black and white. In 1995, ninety-five percent of
black students graduated, the highest rate for blacks among the most
selective universities. 65 Because large state universities, even competi-
tive ones, do not have the same resources to put into admissions deci-
sions, minority graduation rates, particularly those of blacks, lag
behind Harvard's. For example, black graduation rates at twenty-five
flagship state universities, in states with black populations over five
percent, ranged from twenty-eight to eighty-four percent.66 The Uni-
versity of Virginia, which has a reputation similar to that of elite pri-
vate universities, can boast that eighty-four percent of its black
students entering between 1986 and 1989 graduated within six years;
the white rate was ninety-three percent. 67 Harvard, though, had the
highest black student yield rate-at 75.1 percent (139 students)-of
the twenty-five most prestigious universities that collectively enrolled
over 3,000 black freshmen in the class of 2000.68
Harvard is proud of its continuing success in socially engineering
diversified and well-balanced freshman classes that few other universi-
ties can duplicate. 69 Indeed, President Neil Rudenstine reaffirmed the
rationale for Harvard's flexible admissions policies in his Presidential
Report for the years 1993-1995.7o "The primary purpose of diversity
in university admissions, . . represents now, as it has since the mid-
nineteenth century, positive educational values that are fundamental
to the basic mission of colleges and universities. ' 71 Rejecting current
arguments against affirmative action programs, Rudenstine argued
64 See Marcia G. Synnott, Anti-Semitism and American Universities: Did Quotas Follow the
Jews?, in ANTI-SEMITISM AND AMERICAN HISTORY (David A. Gerber ed., 1986).
65 See Overall Graduation Rates of African-American College Students Are on the Rise, J.
BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Autumn 1996, at 68 tbl. [hereinafter Overall Graduation Rates].
66 See id. at 69 tbl.; Virginia is No. 1 in Black Graduation Rate, STATE (Columbia, S.C.),
Dec. 1, 1996, at A18. The University of Arkansas's black graduation rate was twenty-eight
percent; its white graduation rate was forty-one percent. See Black Graduation Rates at Liberal
Arts Colleges, State Universities, and Black Colleges, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Autumn 1996, at
69 tbl. [hereinafter Black Graduation Rates].
67 See Black Graduation Rates, supra note 66, at 69 tbl.
68 See The Progress of Admissions of Black Students at the Nation's Highest-Ranked Colleges
and Universities, J. BLAC.S HIGHER EDUC., Autumn 1996, at 6, 6 tbl.
69 See, e.g., Christopher Jencks & David Riesman, Patterns of Residential Education: A
Case Study of Harvard, in THE AMERICAN COLLEGE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL INTERPRETA-
TION OF THE HIGHER LEARNING 731-73 (Nevitt Sanford ed., 1962) (discussing the Harvard
residential houses and their impact on Harvard undergraduates, particularly how they
shape social and intellectual interactions among students).
70 NEIL RUDENSTINE, THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT 1993-1995 (1996).
71 Id. at 44.
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that, while there are "real" achievements, "they are also too recent,
too fragile, and too incomplete for any relaxation of effort.
'7 2
It is also inescapable that different groups of students have at-
tained different levels of academic readiness and competitiveness in
seeking admission to the most prestigious colleges and universities.
73
Overall, the Harvard Admissions Committee-whose decisionmaking
process has been analogized to the bidding on the floor of the com-
modity exchange markets 74-seems to maintain a reasonably fair bal-
ance of groups. 75 Nevertheless, the Admissions Committee can give
greater weight to legacy applicants and to such underrepresented mi-
norities as African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans than
it can to Asian Americans, whose numbers at the university far exceed
their proportion in the nation's population.
76
72 Id. at 48. Rudenstine rejected three other arguments against affirmative action
programs. He turned aside the argument that other ways and programs would be better
suited to ameliorating economic and social disadvantage; he asserted that affirmative ac-
tion did not seriously stigmatize minority groups when weighed against the benefits it con-
ferred; and he rejected the argument that affirmative action was unfair when it favored the
admission of seemingly weaker minority students over those with strong academic records.
See id.
73 See Theodore Cross & Robert Bruce Slater, Alumni Children Admissions Preferences at
Risk: The Strange Irony of How the Academic Achievements of Asians May Rescue Affirmative Action
for Blacks, J. BLAcWs HIGHER EDUC., Winter 1994/1995, at 87, 89 (noting that, in relation to
the total number of Asians taking the SAT, Asians are over-represented in the highest-
scoring group of SAT-takers, while blacks are disproportionately under-represented).
74 MORTON KELLY & PHYLLIS KELLER, MAKING HARvARDE MODZERN: THE RISE OF
AMERICA'S UNIvEitsliy 467 (2001).
75 See Susie S. Chao, Admissions Officer and Assistant Director of Minority Recruit-
ment & William R. Fitzsimmons, Dean of Admissions and Financial Aid, Statement on
Asian-American Admissions at Harvard and Radcliffe (Jan. 1988).
76 See Eloise Salholz et al., Do Colleges Set Asian Quotas, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 1987, at 60.
Interestingly, "the tremendous success of Asian students on standardized tests may save
affirmative action programs for blacks at the most selective institutions," because "[i]f SAT
scores and grade point averages become the overriding consideration in admissions at...
highly selective schools, Asians would so dominate the admission track that there would
certainly be intolerable outcry from the white alumni who fund, and whose children would
lose places at, these institutions." Cross & Slater, supra note 73, at 90. At highly ranked
universities, Asians often have mean SAT scores at least fifty points higher than the mean
for white students, suggesting that these universities may actively curb Asian admissions.
Id. Despite possible efforts to limit the number of Asian students admitted, the percentage
of Asians doubled between 1982 and 1992 at every Ivy League university but Columbia. Id.
at 87-88. By 1992, Asians, who make up only 7.7 percent of the students taking the SAT,
constituted more than ten percent of the student population at the most prestigious uni-
versities: Harvard, 10.8 percent; Yale, 11.4 percent; MIT, 14.6 percent; Stanford, 15.7 per-
cent; California Institute of Technology, 15.1 percent; Columbia, 11.3 percent; University
of Chicago, 11.4 percent; Brown, 12.2 percent; Northwestern, 10.9 percent; Cornell, 14
percent; and the University of California, Berkeley, 28.5 percent. Id. at 87 tbl. In contrast
to Asian students, whose test scores routinely exceed those of their peers at selective
schools, alumni children at Harvard, for example, scored thirty-five points below their class
mean. See id. at 90. For criticism of legacy admissions policies, particularly at Harvard and
Yale, see John D. L.amb, The Real Affirmative Action Babies: Legacy Preferences at Harvard and
Yale, 26 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PEoB. 491, 515-16 (1993); Mark Muro, Class Privilege: Harvard
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By carefully balancing the admission of legacies, those with spe-
cial talent, and underrepresented minorities, Harvard largely shielded
itself from criticism that colleges and universities used "diversity" to
permit "an enormous amount of discriminatory behavior without re-
quiring a rationale." 7 Abigail Thernstrom, senior fellow at the Man-
hattan Institute, found these seemingly endless preferences
unacceptable, stating that "[n]obody would have ever objected had
affirmative action been aggressive recruitment and a bit of a thumb
on the scale, which is all that is done for veterans, alumni, et cetera. ' '7 s
Many whites and Asian Americans objected to admissions practices
that excluded academically better-qualified students in order to fulfill
an institution's concept of racial diversity. Others, who were not yet
ready to abandon racial preferences as a means of remedying the leg-
acy of discrimination, argued that the benefits of diversity should be
defined explicitly and urged moving beyond the 1960s bipolar view of
two races, black and white, to embrace a multicultural concept of
American nationality.7 9 They also called for a broader concept of "dis-
advantage" that could apply to all racial groups-one that would focus
on income and being the first in one's family to go to college.80
III
HoPwoOD v. TExAS: A CHALLENGE TO BAKE?
Bakke left two racial preferencing questions unanswered. First,
Bakke failed to address the question of how long the practice of racial
preferences in admissions should continue. Second, Bakke failed to
examine how schools that lack Harvard's "social engineering" skills
and resources can avoid "mismatching" students with their academic
environment.
8 '
and Other Elite Schools Favor Children of Alumni-and at Least One Young Alumnus Doesn't Like
It, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 18, 1991, at 43.
77 PBS Democracy Project: Affirmative Action: The History of an Idea (Public Broadcasting
Station, Sept. 6, 1996) (comments of Hugh Davis Graham).
78 Id. (comments of Abigail Thernstrom).
79 See Paul Brest and Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV.
885, 855-56 (1995) (discussing a statement by the Stanford Asian and Pacific Islander Law
Students Association (APILSA) that described the Asian community as a "heterogeneous
group with diverse experiences" that should receive some, rather than no, preferential
consideration in admissions decisions, particularly with respect to Pacific Islanders, Filipi-
nos, and Southeast Asians). See generally Symposium, Race and Remedy in a Multicultural
Society, 47 STAN. L. REv. 855 (1995) (discussing options for implementing affirmative action
in a multiracial society).
80 See Brest & Osbige, supra note 79, at 855-900 (discussing class-based affirmative
action).
81 See Thernstrom, supra note 58, at 62, 62-64 (arguing that many minority students
have been and are "mismatched" to the college to which they have been admitted). Ac-
cording to Thernstrom, fifty-seven percent of white students graduate within six years from
the 301 NCAA Division I higher education institutions compared to only thirty-four per-
cent of black students. Id. at 62. The gap in average SAT scores between black and white
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Successful judicial challenges to racial preferences in university
policies developed by the 1990s. For example, in 1994, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the University of Maryland to stop
offering the annual thirty to forty Benjamin Banneker scholarships
only to black students.8 2 The growing backlash suggested that the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court's proposed race-neutral alternatives to Justice
Powell's "diversity rationale," particularly the creation of "aggressive
programs to identify, recruit, and provide remedial schooling for dis-
advantaged students of all races" and the expansion of the number of
available spaces in state medical schools, 3 had merit. On November
5, 1996, fifty-four percent of California voters approved Proposition
209, a constitutional amendment outlawing racial, ethnic, and gender
preferences "in public employment, public education or public con-
tracting. '8 4 Proposition 209 was sponsored by the California Civil
Rights Initiative, chaired by Ward Connerly, an African-American re-
gent of the University of California. 5 Connerly claimed that over six-
teen percent of the African-American students admitted in 1994 to
the University's Berkeley campus "had been 'admitted by exception,"'
having failed to fulfill the "minimum requirements. 8s 6 In contrast,
only one percent of Asian Americans and two pcrccnt of whites were
similarly unqualified.8 7 In 1997, the last year of affirmative action in
university admissions, the University of California at Berkeley (U.C.-
students at Harvard was only ninety-five points because of the depth and strength of its
applicant pool, which "is so rich with very high-scoring black students that it can admit
large numbers who are not mismatched to the institution." Id. at 63, 64. In contrast, large
gaps between black and white graduation rates are evident at the major flagship state uni-
versities, such as the University of California at Berkeley, because 288 points separate the
mean combined SAT scores of the average black and white students. Id. at 63. Thernstrom
contends that ending "the crutch" of affirmative action could bring "some very positive
results [that] might outweigh the drop in enrollments in elite institutions that would result
temporarily." Id. at 64. But see Editor's Comment, J. BLAcKs HIGHER EDUC., Winter 1994/
1995, at 64-65 (arguing against the mismatch hypothesis by noting that the dropout rates
among black students at I larvard, Brown, and Yale are quite similar to the rates among
whites and noting that dropout rate differentials elsewhere may reflect economic pressures
rather than academic aptitude).
82 See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 153 (4th Cir. 1994).
83 Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152 (Cal. 1976).
84 See Robert Pear, In California, Foes of Affirmative Action See a New Day, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 7, 1996, at B7.
85 See id.
86 See George Will, California Law Would Curb Excesses of Civil Rights Act, STATE (Colum-
bia, S.C.), July 14, 1996, at D2; PBS Democracy Project, supra note 77 (Comments of Ward
Connerly and Abigail Thernstrom).
87 See Will, supra note 86, at D2.
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Berkeley) accepted 562 African American students.88 In 1998, that
number dropped to just 191.89
In the midst of these trends, racial preferences were dealt a major
judicial challenge in Hopwood v. Texas.90 In 1992, four white appli-
cants, who had been rejected from the University of Texas Law School
despite their higher grade-point averages and Law School Admission
Test (LSAT) scores, sued the University of Texas system. 9 1 The plain-
tiffs objected to the color-coding of application forms by race; a mi-
nority subcommittee of three that considered the applications of
blacks and Mexican Americans; the lower test score requirements for
minority applicants; and racially segregated waiting lists.92 On March
19, 1996, the Fifth Circuit unanimously ruled that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not permit the University of Texas Law School to
discriminate against whites and "non-preferred minorities" to increase
the admission of blacks and Mexican Americans.9 3
In writing the decision for the three-judge panel, Judge Jerry E.
Smith challenged the Bakke decision by arguing that the University of
Texas Law School had been unable to show the necessity of remedy-
ing the present legacies of identifiable past discrimination, 94 one of
Justice Powell's compelling state interests. Judge Smith also rejected
Powell's diversity argument as establishing "a compelling interest
under the Fourteenth Amendment."95 Indeed, in terms of contribut-
ing "diversity of viewpoint," Cheryl Hopwood, who was denied admis-
sion despite a 3.8 grade point average, could argue that she would
bring diversity as the spouse of a member of the Armed Services and
as the mother of a child handicapped with cerebral palsy. 96 Although
Judge Smith applied a strict scrutiny standard to the use of race in
university admissions policies, he cited, as Justice Powell had in 1978,
a variety of flexible factors that could be used in admitting students.
97
While some of these factors correlated with race, Smith flatly ruled
out the use of race, even as a "proxy" for disadvantage. 98
88 Michelle Locke, Enrollment of Blacks at Berkeley Dropping, BOSTON GLOBE, June 4,
2004, at A3.
89 Id. By 2000, the number of African-American students accepted to the freshman
class at U.C.-Berkeley had risen again to 338 students. Id.
90 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
91 Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 581 (W.D. Tex. 1994) ("The plaintiffs placed
[a] chart in evidence to show their numerical standing above that of the majority of minor-
ides offered admission."), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). For a detailed account of the
Hopwood plaintiffs' admissions data, see id. at 564-67.
92 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935-38.
93 Id. at 962.
94 Id. at 955.
95 Id. at 944.
96 Id. at 946-47.
97 See id. at 946.
98 See id.
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Reactions to the Fifth Circuit's decision were mixed. Michael S.
Greve, executive director of the Center for Individual Rights, which
represented two of the Hopwood plaintiffs, applauded the court's rejec-
tion of the "middle ground" between "mild race preferences" and
"quotas" that Justice Powell had sought to define in Bakke.99 Indeed,
Bakke had led many college officials to infer "that quotas are okay, so
long as you disguise them."100 Hopwoods importance, Greve argued,
"lies in its realization that we cannot get beyond race by constantly
taking it into account."''
On the other hand, Michael A. Olivas, a professor at the Univer-
sity of Houston Law Center, praised "Powell's carefully crafted and
nuanced plurality opinion," which had constructively reassured "uni-
versities that they still had discretion and latitude in choosing from
among their many applicants." 10 2 According to Professor Olivas, Hop-
wood rejected Bakke's nuances in favor of a "stark, almost Manichaean"
view that students are admitted either wholly on their own merits or
only because of racial preferences.'
0 3
Hopwood foresaw widespread judicial curtailment of race-based af-
firmative action policies in higher education. 10 4 OnJuly 1, 1996, how-
ever, the Supreme Court declined to review the Fifth Circuit's
decision. 10 5 In December 1998, Washington became the second state
to impose a voter-approved ban on racial and gender preferences in
public colleges and government agencies. 10 6 Meanwhile, Hopwood led
to a sharp decrease in minority student enrollments at Texas universi-
ties. 107 Whereas thirty-one African-American and forty-two Hispanic
students had been among the 500 hundred students entering the Uni-
versity of Texas Law School in 1996-97, only three black and twenty
Hispanic students joined the 1997-98 classi 0 8 Similar declines in mi-
nority student applications and enrollments occurred at the University
99 Michael S. Greve, Ruling Out Race: A Bold Step to Make Colleges Colorblind, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 29, 1996, at B2.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Michael A. Olivas, The Decision is Fatly, Unequivocally Wrong, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Mar. 29, 1996, at B3.
103 Id.
104 Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admis-
sions, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1045, 1045-46 (2002).
105 See Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
106 See Ethan Bronner, U. of Washington Will End Race-Conscious Admissions, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 7, 1998, at A12; Sam Howe Varhovek & B. Drummon Ayres,Jr., Voters Back End to State
Preferences, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1998, at B2.
107 Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and the
Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 381, 382 n.7 (1998).
108 See id. (citing Peter Applebome, Affirmative Action Ban Changes a Law School, N.Y.
TIMESJuly 2, 1997, at B12).
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of Houston Law Center and Texas Tech University.' 0 9 Hispanic and
African-American undergraduate applications to the University of
Texas at Austin fell by twenty-three and twenty-six percent, respec-
tively, despite an overall decline in admissions of only thirteen per-
cent."l0 Similarly, Hispanic and African-American undergraduate
applications to Texas A&M University fell by eighteen and thirty per-
cent, respectively. I I
Among the defenders of Bakke in the aftermath of Hopwood was
Goodwin Liu, then clerking at the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. 112 Liu anticipated that the Supreme Court would soon
have to decide "whether educational diversity is a constitutionally
'compelling' interest that justifies the use of race in university admis-
sions." 3 Liu noted that most defenders of diversity relied not on
constitutional jurisprudence, but on educational policy arguments,
such as the argument that all students benefit from classroom interac-
tions with those from diverse cultural, ethnic, and racial back-
grounds."t 4 Contending that in some circumstances the diversity
rationale does not violate equal protection doctrine, Liu proposed "a
set of evidentiary standards that a public university must meet in order
to implement diversity-based affirmative action."1 15 He emphasized
that the controversy over racial preferencing involved only the most
competitive twenty percent of colleges and universities, where the
number of applicants far exceeds the number of available places. 116
Liu also emphasized that most whites denied admission were rejected
in favor of other white applicants, not in favor of the comparatively
small number of minorities admitted.
117
IV
CHALLENGING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHRGAN
The University of Michigan cases provided the Supreme Court
with an opportunity to resolve a circuit split regarding Justice Powell's
reasoning in Bakke. Whereas in Hopwood the Fifth Circuit rejected
Powell's view that diversity may be "a compelling interest that justifies
109 Id. (citing Kate Thomas, More 'Hopwood' Fallout, NAT'L LJ., June 9, 1997, at A6).
110 Id. (citing Applebome, supra note 108, at B12).
111 Id. (citing A. Phillips Brooks, Colleges' Minority Situation Awkward; A&M President
Addresses, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, June 25, 1997, at BI).
112 Id. at 381-83.
113 Id. at 382.
114 See id. at 382-83.
115 Id. at 385.
116 See id. at 382 n.5 (citing THOMAS KANE, R-XCIAL AND ETHIC PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE
ADMISSIONS 2 (1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with Goodwin Liu)).
117 See id. at 422-23 n.192.
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consideration of race in university admissions,"' "I in Smith v. University
of Washington,' I the Ninth Circuit ruled that diversity is a compelling
state interest. 20 Meanwhile, in Johnson v. Board of Regents of University
of Georgia,12' the Eleventh Circuit ruled that an inflexible admissions
policy awarding fixed numerical points to the scores of non-white ap-
plicants was not narrowly tailored to achieve student diversity. 22 The
Eleventh Circuit declined, however, to consider whether diversity in
college admissions constituted a "compelling government interest."'
2'2
Rather, the court concluded that a policy giving a racial "plus" or
bonus was not absolutely necessary to achieve diversity, nor did the
policy meet the strict scrutiny test, especially since minority applica-
tions received a "plus" even before they were read.
2 4
Like Allan Bakke, the three white plaintiffs in the University of
Michigan cases had interesting personal stories and a strong desire to
attend undergraduate or professional education at their first choice
institution, the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. Barbara Grutter,
the fourth of nine children of a Protestant minister, worked her way
through Michigan State University and became a computer and tech-
nology consultant for hospitals.' 25 Wanting to become a lawyer with
expertise in health care, Grutter, the mother of two children and the
wife of a Ford Motor Company engineer, applied in 1996 to the law
schools at the University of Michigan and Wayne State University.'2
She scored in the 86th percentile on the LSAT and had a 3.8 grade
point average. 127 She believed that her life experiences set her apart
from other applicants.1 28 Nevertheless, the University of Michigan did
not accept her as one of the 1,218 first-year law students it admitted
118 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 947 (5th Cir. 1996) ("To foster... diversity, state
universities and law schools and other governmental entities must scrutinize applicants
individually, rather than resorting to the dangerous proxy of race.").
119 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000).
120 Id. at 1201 ("(Tihe Fourteenth Amendment permits University admissions pro-
grams which consider race for other than remedial purposes, and educational diversity is a
compelling governmental interest that meets the demands of strict scrutiny of race-con-
scious measures.").
121 263 F.3d 1234 (l1th Cir. 2001).
122 Id. at 1245-46.
123 Id. ("We need not, and do not, resolve in this opinion whether student body diver-
sity ever may be a compelling interest supporting a university's consideration of race in its
admissions process.").
124 id.







out of 3,429 applicants for 1997.129 Though she was accepted at
Wayne State, she chose not to attend because it offered fewer courses
in her area of interest. 130
In 1995, Jennifer Gratz, the daughter of a police officer and sec-
retary living in a Detroit working-class suburb, had a 3.8 high school
grade point average and an American College Test (ACT) score in the
83rd percentile. She dreamed of becoming a forensic pathologist or
physician."" Patrick Hamacher of Flint, a Michigan high school var-
sity athlete who sang in the choir, had a 3.4 high school grade point
average and an ACT score above the 90th percentile. 32 In 1997,
when he applied to the University of Michigan to prepare for a career
in medical or public administration, the university admitted 3,958
freshmen out of about 13,500 applicants.' 33 Neither Gratz nor
Hamacher was admitted to the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor.
Gratz believed that she was rejected because of a university policy
that awarded 20 points out of 150 points to African Americans, His-
panics, and Native Americans.1M She felt that minority students with
"lesser grades, lesser test scores, [and] lesser activities" had benefited
from racial preferences. 13 5 Turning down a spot on the waiting list
for the Ann Arbor campus, Gratz attended the University of Michi-
gan's Dearborn campus and earned a mathematics degree. 136 In
1997, she volunteered to join a suit sponsored by the Center for Indi-
vidual Rights, a public policy law firm, to challenge the University of
Michigan's preferences for minority applicants.' 37 Gratz became the
lead plaintiff, together with Patrick Hamacher, who earned his under-
graduate degree from Michigan State University in East Lansing.
1 38
Hamacher, who took graduate courses in public administration while
working in the budget office of Flint's city recreation department, felt
"a wrong had occurred" because he "was never able to choose.1 39
The lawsuit brought by Gratz and Humacher was linked with the sepa-
129 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 312-13. For statistical tables on law school
applicants, admissions, and numbers and percentages of African Americans from 1995 to
2000, see id. at 383-84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
130 See Steinberg, supra note 125, at 32.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 814 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev'd, 539 U.S.
244 (2003).
134 Steinberg, supra note 125, at 32.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Peter Y. Hong, Minority Admissions Policy is First to be Reviewed by Supreme Court in 25
years, at http://aad.english.ucsb.edu/docs/untitled-12.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
138 Id.
139 Steinberg, supra note 125, at 32.
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rate lawsuit of Barbara Grutter against the University of Michigan Law
School. 140
In May 2002, the Sixth Circuit, in a 5-4 en banc decision, re-
versed the district court's ruling against the University of Michigan
Law School's admissions system.14 ' For Judge Friedman, who au-
thored the district court opinion, student diversity was not a compel-
ling government interest and, even if it were, the law school's policy
was not narrowly tailored to achieve such a goal. 14 2 The majority of
the Sixth Circuit disagreed, relying on Bakke to hold that "the Law
School has a compelling state interest in achieving a diverse student
body," and that the Law School's admissions policy of considering cer-
tain minorities as a "plus" was narrowly tailored to that interest.
143
The Center for Individual Rights filed a certiorari petition to the U.S.
Supreme Court asking for a review of the Sixth Circuit's Grutter deci-
sion. 144 In response, the University of Michigan filed briefs opposing
Supreme Court review.
145
In Gratz v. Bollinger, the district court held the University of Michi-
gan's undergraduate admissions program constitutional.146 In his ma-
jority opinion, District Judge Duggan asserted that "a racially and
ethnically diverse student body . . . constitutes a compelling govern-
mental interest under strict scrutiny," and that the addition of twenty
points to a minority applicant's selection index score did not cause
the admissions systems to operate as a "two-track" system, which would
be prohibited under Bakke.147 Before the Sixth Circuit could decide
the plaintiffs' appeal, both the Center for Individual Rights and the
plaintiffs filed petitions seeking a prejudgment writ of certiorari. As
in Grutter, the university filed a brief opposing review.' 48
In December 2002, the Supreme Court granted writs of certiorari
in both Grutterand Gratz.149 By April 2003, sixty-seven briefs were filed
140 See id.
141 Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), rev' 137 F. Supp. 2d
821 (E.D. Mich. 2001), affd 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
142 Id. at 849-50.
143 Grutter, 288 F.3d at 742, 749. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Boggs cited Marcia
Graham Synnott's The Half-Opened Door. While agreeing with the two rulings in Bakke, Syn-
nott recognized that "the narrowness of the majority as well as the ambiguities in Powell's
opinion have opened the courtroom door to future litigation over admissions programs
that favor minority applicants." SvNNoTr, supra note 56, at 225-30.
144 Center for Individual Rights, Chronology of the University of Michigan Cases [hereinaf-
ter Center for Individual Rights Timeline], at http://www.cir-usa.org/cases/michi-
gan-timeline.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
145 Id.
146 Gratzv. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 827 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev'd inpar 539 U.S.
244 (2003).
147 Id.




in support of the University of Michigan in Grutter, eleven in support
of the petitioners, and four in support of neither party.150 The stu-
dent petitioners themselves recognized the educational advantages of
diversity without conceding that its benefits were "a constitutionally
compelling state interest."' 15 Siding with the petitioners, the Bush ad-
ministration filed its own brief onJanuary 16, 2003.152 President Bush
denounced both the awarding of twenty points to African-American,
Hispanic, and Native-American applicants to the undergraduate col-
lege and the "numerical targets for incoming minority students to the
law school.115 3 President Bush cited "race-neutral admissions policies"
in California, Florida, and Texas that admitted a percentage of top
students from every high school to show that "diversity can be
achieved without using quotas."'
154
Prior to the presentation of arguments before the Supreme
Court, a broad coalition of groups began to plan public events in sup-
port of affirmative action. 155 Among them were members of United
for Equality and Affirmative Action (UEAA), Coalition to Defend Af-
firmative Action & Integration and Fight for Equality By Any Means
Necessary (BAMN), Law Students for Affirmative Action, and a racial
cross-section of forty-one individual students. 156 Pledging to "Defend
Affirmative Action and Save Brown v. Board of Education!," the stu-
dent intervenor-defendants in Gr'utter held a press conference outside
the U.S. Supreme Court on December 2, 2002.157 In January 2003,
BAMN sponsored the National Civil Rights Summit and Conference
at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 5 8 A National Civil Rights
March was held on April 1, 2003-the day the Supreme Court began
its hearings-supported by civil rights activists, Jesse Jackson's Rain-
bow/PUSH Coalition, and the National Organization for Women
(NOW).159
150 Amicus Briefs Summary, supra note 14.
151 See Petitioner's Brief at 34, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
152 Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(No. 02-241).
153 President George W. Bush, Remarks on the Michigan Affirmative Action Case (Jan.
15, 2003), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01-7.html (last visited Nov.
16, 2004).
154 Id.
155 See, e.g., Civil Rights March to the Supreme Court: Defend Affirmative Action and
Save Brown v. Board of Education [hereinafter Civil Rights March], at http://
www.bamnn.com/wdc/index.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2004); DAAP-Our Record of Lead-
ership, at http://rwww.umich.edu/-daap/our-record.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
156 See Civil Rights March, supra note 155.
157 See id.
158 DAAP-Our Record of Leadership, supra note 155.
159 Debbi Wilgoren & Manny Fernandez, A Defense Team of Thousands: Diverse Crowd
Urges High Court to Protect Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2003, at B1.
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To persuade the Supreme Court to uphold Bakke's acceptance of
race as one of many factors in admissions decisions, briefs were filed
by a wide range of groups, including representatives of leading busi-
ness corporations, retired military leaders, including three former
chairmen of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ivy League and other col-
leges and universities, law students, civil rights veterans, and American
Jewish groups."' 0 The amici curiae brief filed by Harvard, Brown,
Duke, Princeton, and Yale universities, together with Dartmouth Col-
lege, the University of Chicago, and the University of Pennsylvania,
argued that racial diversity was an educational benefit to all students
and prepared them for leadership in a multi-ethnic and multi-racial
society. 16 1 Because it would be difficult, if not impossible, to show that
these universities were guilty of relatively recent prior discrimination,
the brief shifted the argument to emphasize the importance of devel-
oping "educational programs that are forward-looking and inclusive"
and "training future leaders for a diverse and pluralistic society."
162
Universities could best "perform their broad educational function" if
they were allowed to consider race and ethnicity on an "individual-
ized" basis, as was permitted under Bakke.163 Such individualized con-
sideration was neither a quota nor a device for proportionate
representation, because no slots were reserved to particular racial mi-
norities and no one was excluded on account of their race. 164 The
brief stated that no group, "including African Americans, has a 'right'
to proportionate representation either in academia or in the profes-
sions," but "carefully tailored" efforts to include racial minorities "vio-
lates no right on the part of others and no constitutional or statutory
commitment of our society."'
165
The brief persuasively argued that universities were in the best
position to weigh the academic and personal qualifications of each
applicant.1 66 The brief also urged the Supreme Court to uphold "the
judicially recognized and constitutionally grounded tradition of aca-
demic freedom, and the deeply ingrained practice of deference to ed-
ucators' judgments on educational matters. ' 167 Since Harvard, Yale,
and Princeton had moved to "need-blind admissions systems," focus-
ing on economic disadvantage as a "race-neutral" means of diversifica-
tion would not increase minority representation. 168 Admission by
160 See Amicus Briefs Summary, supra note 14.
161 Harvard Brief, supra note 9.
162 Id. at 7, 14.
163 Id. at 15.
164 Id. at 26-27.
165 Id. at 27-28.
166 Id. at 15.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 22-23.
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class rank or placement in the top ten percent of a high school class
was equally unsuitable for smaller, academically selective universi-
ties. 169 For example, Harvard College received applications from al-
most 2,900 high school valedictorians for the 2,066 places in its first-
year class. 170 Universities needed to be free to consider a range of
factors, none of which automatically had top priority. 171 In addition
to economic disadvantage, universities considered "unusual athletic
ability, distinctive artistic or musical talent, significant hardships that
have been overcome, and familial experience with higher education
as well as academic achievement and aptitude.
172
The brief rejected the petitioners' contention "that consideration
of race and ethnicity will create an ever-expanding precedent that can
have no temporal stopping point and that will lead to claims by other
groups-whether social, religious, or ideological-for 'fair' represen-
tation on our university campuses." 173 While not suggesting a timeta-
ble for the end to racial preferences, the brief concluded that "even if
there must be an ultimate end to the consideration of race in univer-
sity admissions, it is surely premature to declare that the end is upon
us.
''
174 Although minority students made more progress than non-mi-
nority students between 1976 and 1995 in improving their average
SAT scores (70-150 points at research universities and 30-130 points
at liberal arts colleges), the historical legacies of discrimination "can-
not be expected to play themselves out within a single generation." 175
Another group of twenty-eight prestigious private colleges and
universities, including Amherst, Barnard, Bowdoin, Bryn Mawr, Col-
gate, Mount Holyoke, Smith, Tufts, Vassar, Wellesley, Wesleyan, and
Williams, also filed an amici curiae brief arguing for the freedom to
use race as a factor in creating a diverse student body.1 76 These
schools argued that because every applicant's admissions folder has
"multiple readers" followed by open discussion and evaluation, "a
race-blind admission process" was impossible.1 77 Keenly conscious of
differences among applicants, these elite colleges sought to use that
knowledge "intelligendy as part of their complex weighing of multiple
169 Id. at 25.
170 Id. at 24.
171 See id. at 24-25.
172 Id. at 21.
173 Id. at 27.
174 Id. at 28.
175 Id. at 29.
176 Brief of Amici Curiae Amherst College et al. at 1, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (No. 02-241) [hereinafter Amherst Brief], available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.
com/supremecourt/briefs/02-241/02-241.mer.ami.amherst.pdf (last visited Nov. 16,
2004).
177 Id. at 13.
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factors that leads to judgments as to whom to admit.' t7 For private
liberal arts colleges, adopting "mechanical formulas looking to grades,
test scores, or graduation rank-would radically change the profile of
each college." 179 Indeed, if forced to adopt the "mechanical formu-
las" practiced by Florida, Texas, and California that the briefs of the
United States and the petitioners suggested were suitable alternatives,
the colleges feared they would end up trading "selectivity for diver-
sity." ' 8 0 The Amherst Brief contended that neither admission accord-
ing to a "percentage of each high school class," used by Texas and
Florida, nor "Florida's guarantee of placement to all students who suc-
cessfully complete a two year degree at a community college" would
work at a small, highly selective private college.'
8'
Similar arguments were presented in the brief submitted by Co-
lumbia, Cornell, Georgetown, Rice, and Vanderbilt. 18 2 These five in-
stitutions took a clear position in support of the respondents, stating:
"Each of the amici curiae, like virtually every university in the nation,
has reached the conclusion that completely race-blind admissions
practices frustrate or otherwise impede its effort to achieve a sufficient
level of diversity in its student body to effectuate its academic mis-
sion." t83 Agreeing with "the respondents and other amici curiae that
diversity is a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment
and Title VI," the briefjustified "the use of ethnicity or race as one of
many 'plus' factors to achieve educational diversity."1 84 Rather than
repeating the arguments of the other briefs, Columbia, Cornell, Ge-
orgetown, Rice, and Vanderbilt focused on what they believed was a
key issue: "[T] he need for this Court to give a high level of deference
to the good faith admissions decisions of public and private universi-
ties around the nation and the unconstitutional impact on academic
freedom of any ruling failing to do So.
'
185
Carnegie Mellon University and thirty-seven other private col-
leges and universities filed a separate brief supporting the respon-
dents on the grounds of academic freedom and a "spirit of
178 Id. at 13-14.
17q Id. at 14.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Brief of Amici Curiae Columbia University et al., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (No. 02-241), available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supremecourt/briefs/
02-241/02-241.mer.ami.cu.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
183 Id. at 3-4 (italics omitted).
184 Id. at 4.
185 Id. Justice O'Connor eventually echoed this sentiment in her opinion for the
Court in Grutter, quotingJustice Powell in Bakke. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329
(2003) ("The freedom of a university to make its judgments as to education includes the




experimentation. ' 186 Their brief argued for a reaffirmation of Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke that colleges and universities could consider
race as one narrowly tailored factor among other factors in an effort
to achieve diversity. 187 The Carnegie Mellon brief added, "[t]here is
no credible dispute as to the truths spoken by Justice Powell in
Bakke-that a racially diverse student body serves and enriches the
higher education of all students and is essential to the training of lead-
ers for our pluralistic world." 18 8 The brief claimed that diverse per-
spectives have enriched the legal profession and the courts, 1 9 as
Justice O'Connor recognized in an article honoring Supreme Court
Justice Thurgood Marshall. 190 Justice Marshall's "special perspective,"
based on his familiarity with those who had experienced racial dis-
crimination, was a personal one, not a "'racial' perspective." 191
The Carnegie Mellon brief contended that "race-neutral strate-
gies. . . could not work for selective private colleges and universities,"
because their "limited size" rendered a "guaranteed admissions pro-
gram" such as those adopted by California, Texas, and Florida, which
guarantee admission to the top four, ten and twenty percent of gradu-
ating seniors within their states, "unworkable." 192 In fact, the amici
institutions asserted that the "race neutral" admissions programs "de-
pend entirely upon continued segregation among the states' high
schools," to achieve diversity. 9 Additionally, percentage plans may
reward those students who take less demanding classes, and the plans
do not differentiate between competitive high schools and those that
provided academically weaker preparation. 1
94
The Carnegie Mellon brief also rejected excessive reliance on
SAT scores because of the continuing disparities between African-
American and white students. 195 In 2002, the mean score for white
students on the verbal portion of the test was ninety-seven points
higher than for African-American students, while the mean score for
white students on the math portion of the test was 106 points higher
186 Brief of Amici Curiae Carnegie Mellon University et al. at 16, Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-516) [hereinafter Carnegie Mellon Brief], available at http://
supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme-court/briefs/02-241/02-241.mer.ami.cmu.pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 16, 2004).
187 Id. at 9.
188 Id. at 6.
189 See id.
190 Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The influence of a Raconteur, 44 S-rx-. L.
REv. 1217 (1992).
191 Carnegie Mellon Brief, supra note 186, at 8 (citing O'Connor, supra note 190, at
1217).
192 Id. at .9-10.
193 Id. at 12.
194 Id. at 13.
195 Id. at 14.
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than for African-American students)196 Only two percent of blacks
scored above 650 on either the verbal or math portion of the SAT, in
contrast to whites, twelve percent of whom scored above 650 on the
verbal portion and fifteen percent of whom scored above 650 on the
math portion. 197 Nevertheless, once admitted to college, many minor-
ity students prospered and contributed to their educational
institution.19 8
V
THE EXPERT REPORTS OF WILLiAM G. BOWEN AND
DEREK BOK
In addition to support received from amici curiae briefs, the Uni-
versity of Michigan recruited nine experts to buttress its argument
with a series of reports, together entitled "The Compelling Need for
Diversity in Higher Education." 99 Two of the most influential ex-
perts to submit reports were William G. Bowen, President of The An-
drew W. Mellon Foundation and former president of Princeton
University, and Derek Bok, Professor at Harvard University's John F.
Kennedy School of Government and former president of Harvard
University.200 Their defenses of affirmative action drew from their
book, The Shape of the River: Long-Term Consequences of Considering Race
in College and University Admissions,2°1 which looked at one of the first
studies to provide "the empirical evidence necessary for an informed
discussion" of "race-conscious admissions policies." 20 2
In The Shape of the River, Bowen and Bok studied The College and
Beyond Database, compiled by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.
The database documents the college careers of more than 80,000 full-
time students, 3,500 of them black, who matriculated to twenty-eight




199 See Introduction, in THE COMPELLING NEED FOR DivEsrTy IN HIGHER EDUCATION 1, 2
(1999) [hereinafter The Compelling Need Reports], available at http://www.umich.edu/
-urel/admissions/research/expert/intro.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
200 Id.
201 See id. at 8 (citing WInLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-
TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS
(1998)).
202 Id.
203 Bowen and Bok surveyed twenty-eight institutions (four public universities, thirteen
private universities, seven coeducational liberal arts colleges, and four all-women's col-
leges): Miami University (Ohio), University of Michigan (Ann Arbor), University of North
Carolina (Chapel Hill), and Pennsylvania State University; Columbia, Duke, Emory, North-
western, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton, Rice, Stanford, Tufts, Tulane, Vanderbilt,
Washington, and Yale; Denison, Hamilton, Kenyon, Oberlin, Swarthmore, Wesleyan, and
Williams; and Barnard, Bryn Mawr, Smith, and Wellesley. See BOWEN & BOK, supra note
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a select number of the students in the database regarding their post-
college careers garnered an eighty percent response rate.20 4 Bowen
and Bok found that the African-American students who matriculated
at universities like Harvard, Yale, and the University of Michigan had
lower SAT scores, lower high school grade point averages, and gradu-
ated at a lower rate than white students. Nonetheless, these African-
American students tended to be as successful as their white peers in
graduate schools and in their subsequent careers. Indeed, the survey
of 700 blacks admitted in 1976 with lower test scores and grades than
their white counterparts demonstrated a high level of success.
20 5
Graduation rates for these minority students were as high as seventy-
five percent. Almost one-third (225) earned professional degrees or
doctorates and earned an average of $71,000 a year, almost double the
average for black graduates nationwide. In addition, not only were
they extensively involved in civic and community activities, they were
much more likely than their white counterparts to hold leadership
positions in these organizations.
20 6
Bowen and Bok did not base their argument in support of diver-
sity in education on the need to remedy the effects of past discrimina-
tion against racial minority students, perhaps because that chapter in
their own universities' history had ended by the early 1960s. Instead,
they argued that creating a more diversified student body conferred
both present and future benefits on white students as well as on racial
minority students. 20 7 They replaced the phrase "affirmative action"
with the new code words "diversity" and "fairness" and redefined the
ways of measuring "merit."20 8 In their view, universities needed to
201, at 292 tbl.A.1. The study analyzed data collected on students who entered college in
the fall of 1951, 1976, and 1989. Id. at 291. Because less than one percent of students who
enrolled in these institutions in 1951 were minorities, the book focuses on the data from
1976 and 1989. Id. at 291 n.2. Spurred by both the civil rights movement and the desire to
broaden their educational environments, selective colleges almost tripled their percent-
ages of African-American students, from 2.3 percent in 1967 to 6.4 percent in 1976. See id.
It is important to note dramatic changes to the student bodies of certain schools between
data sets. For instance, of the seven "coeducational liberal arts institutions," Hamilton,
Kenyon, Wesleyan, and Williams admitted only men in 1951, but were coeducational by
1989. Id. at 293 n.3. Similarly, four of the institutions in the "private universities" category
were originally all-male-Emory, Princeton, Columbia, and Yale-but only Columbia re-
mained all-male in 1976. Id.
204 See id. at 303.
205 Id. at 285.
206 Id. at 256-58. The question of whether the 700 rejected whites with higher scores
and grades would have accomplished as much or more had they been admitted to these
highly selective institutions remained unanswered. However, the chances of admissions for
those rejected white applicants would only have improved by about two percent if more
than half the African-Amnerican applicants admitted had been declined. Id. at 285.
207 See id. at 276-78.
208 See id. For a discussion of the shift in code words, see Terry H. Anderson, The
Backlash and Demise of Affirmative Action, in AFFIRMATIVE AcGHiON IN RECENT AMERICAN His-
TORy (paper presented at the Organization of American Historians, Mar. 27, 2004).
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look beyond test scores and grades to include such subjective factors
as an applicant's ability to contribute to the overall educational exper-
iences of the student population and the applicant's potential for
leadership after graduation. 20 9 Bowen asserted that highly selective
institutions have many more qualified candidates than they can ad-
mit.210 After selecting the most outstanding, many of whom have
been admitted to other highly competitive institutions, admissions of-
ficers must choose the remaining members of a new freshman class
"from among the large group who also have very strong qualifications,
who are thought capable of doing the work and doing it well, but are
not so clearly outstanding as to be placed in the very top category.
211
Since no "applicant has a 'right' to a place in a college or university,"
admissions officers operate under "an obligation to make the best pos-
sible use of the limited number of places in each entering class so as
to advance as effectively as possible the broad purposes the school
seeks to serve."21 2 Although "a school should try to be fair to every
applicant," fairness, Bowen implied, did not limit itself to considering
only test scores and grades.
213
Bowen and Bok did not believe "that admission to a selective uni-
versity is a right possessed by anyone." 214 Since the rewards of gradu-
ating from an Ivy League college were great for both individual
students and for society as a whole, admissions must be based "on the
merits."215 But "grades and scores predict only 15-20 percent of the
variance among all students in academic performance and a smaller
percentage among black students" because other factors such as "in-
herited ability, family circumstances, and early upbringing," as well as
better teachers, also shaped achievement.2 1 6 Thus, argued Bowen and
Bok, "fairness" does not mean accepting all "A" students before admit-
ting any "B" students, who may possess greater motivation and poten-
tial to contribute to a career and to society. Rather, fairness is
achieved by judging each applicant "according to a consistent set of
criteria that reflect the objectives of the college and university."
2 17
Race is relevant in determining which candidates "merit" admission,
209 BOWEN & BOK, supra note 201, at 276-78; see also Ethan Bronner, Study Strongly
Supports Affirmative Action in Admissions to Elite College, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998, at B10
(summarizing findings of the Bowen & Bok study).
210 Expert Report of William G. Bowen, in The Compelling Need Reports, supra note 199,
at 236 [hereinafter Bowen Export Report].
211 id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 237; see also BOWEN & BOK, supra note 201, at 276-78 (redefining merit to
include factors beyond grades and test scores).
214 BOWEN & BOK, supra 201, at 277.
215 Id. at 276.
216 Id. at 277.
217 Id. at 277-78.
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"because taking account of race helps institutions achieve three objec-
tives central to their mission-identifying individuals of high poten-
tial, permitting students to benefit educationally from diversity on
campus, and addressing long-term societal needs. ' '21s Thus, the re-
sponsibility of admissions officers is to select "which set of applicants,
considered individually and collectively, will take fullest advantage of what
the college has to offer, contribute most to the educational process in
college, and be most successful in what they have learned for the ben-
efit of the larger society.
' 1 9
Bowen's report eloquently expanded on Woodrow Wilson's vi-
sion while president of Princeton. When students exchanged views
with others from all sections of the nation and from foreign countries
"'between the hours of 6 P.M. and 9 A.M.,'"220 they had "to reexamine
even their most deeply held assumptions about themselves and their world.1
221
Since proportionately fewer poor black and Hispanic children were
academically qualified for the most competitive universities than poor
white children (families with incomes under $20,000), Bowen asserted
that a class-based admissions policy, rather than a race-sensitive one,
"would substantially reduce the minority enrollments at selective insti-
tutions" while changing dramatically their overall student profiles.
222
Educating a diverse student body was critical "at the highest levels of
business, the professions, government, and society at large,"2 23 be-
cause by 2030, forty percent of the American population might well be
of minority heritage. 224 Furthermore, society as a whole benefits from
a diverse educational environment. Racial interaction among stu-
dents is one of the three most influential factors associated with in-
creased acceptance of other cultures, participation in community
service programs, and acceptance of responsibility in other aspects of
civic life.225 For Bowen, the conclusion was inescapable: "Both the
growing diversity of American society and the increasing interaction
with other cultures worldwide make it evident that going to school
only with 'the likes of oneself' will be increasingly anachronistic.
'" 226
Bowen and Bok also rejected the stigmatization argument ad-
vanced by Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom in America in Black and
218 Id. at 278.
219 Id. at 277.
220 SYNNOTr, supra note 56, at 173 (citations omitted); Bowen Expert Report, supra note
210, at 3.
221 Bowen Expert Report, supra note 210, at 237.
222 BOMWEN & BOK, supra note 201, at 271.
223 Bowen Expert Report, supra note 210, at 241.
224 BOWEN & BOK, supra note 201, at 11-12.
225 Id. at 266-76.
226 Id. at 279.
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White.22 7 Bowen and Bok's analysis of the College and Beyond data
showed that far from being discouraged by academic competition
with students with higher entrance test scores and grades, by 1989
black students at elite schools were nearly twice as likely to graduate
(75 percent) than black students nationwide (40 percent). 228 Bowen
and Bok also argued that under "race-neutral" admissions policies the
percentage of blacks admitted to selective colleges would have
dropped from about seven percent to two percent.
2 2 9
In analyzing the consequences of eliminating race-sensitive ad-
missions at law schools, Bok and Bowen relied on a study conducted
by Linda F. Wightman. Wightman looked at the application and deci-
sion data of 90,335 law school applicants in the 1990-91 application
year.230 Wightman's study revealed that if admissions decisions in
1991 were based on undergraduate grade point average and LSAT
scores, only 711 (1.6 percent of the total number of students ac-
cepted) of 3,435 blacks would have been accepted, 23 1 a number al-
most identical to that in 1965.232 Furthermore, under the "law school
grid" model, which classified the ABA-approved law schools into six
clusters ranked by selectivity, black enrollment would have dropped to
0.44 percent in the most selective "Cluster 1" schools, with 30.37 per-
cent of the 711 black applicants accepted only by the least competitive
"Cluster 6" law schools.
233
Bok's expert report concluded "that a university's interest in
achieving diversity among its student body attaches to legal education,
in ways that are largely similar to, although in some ways different
from, the interest in achieving diversity in an undergraduate student
body. ' 23 4 If racial diversity were eliminated in law school admissions,
"the exclusive gateway to the American legal profession," 23 5 the num-
ber of black students would plummet.2 36 To counteract the fact that,
in 1965, of the one percent of law students who were African-Ameri-
can, more than one-third were in all-black law schools, Erwin Gris-
wold, dean of Harvard Law School, launched a special summer
227 See id. at 85 & n.38 (criticizing the argument in STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABICAIL
THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE 388, 422 (1997)).
228 Id. at 55-57.
229 Id. at 51.
230 See Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analy-
sis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admissions Decisions, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1997).
231 BOWEN & BOK, supra note 201, at 5, 44-45; see Wightman, supra note 230, at 15, 28,
232 See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 201, at 5.
233 See Wightman, supra note 230, at 23, 30 tbl.
234 Expert Report of Derek Bok, in The Compelling Need Reports, supra note 199, at 253
[hereinafter Bok Expert Report].
23-5 Id. at 254.
236 See id. at 258 ("[A]n admissions policy that relied primarily on test scores would
lead to the rejection of qualified minority applicants.").
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program to encourage juniors from historically black colleges to apply
to historically white law schools. 237 As other law schools followed suit,
the percentage of black law students rose to 4.5 percent by 1975.238
Bok's expert report also reaffirmed Bakke's view that the United
States needed to rely on leaders exposed to the views of its diverse
population. 239 Bok commented that "[t]his is certainly true of the na-
tion's lawyers," arguing that the legal profession needs minority law-
yers not only to protect the rights of their own groups, but also to be
able to interact with clients of diverse backgrounds. 240 Equally impor-
tant, minority law students need to interact with white law students,
because the two groups will inevitably work together after law
school.
24 '
Since the 1980s, as part of fulfilling accreditation requirements,
the nation's law schools have been obligated to recruit an ethnically
and racially diverse student body and to address problems of discrimi-
nation experienced by minorities.2 42 Nonetheless, in 1990, African
Americans, Asian Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans to-
gether comprised only eight percent of American lawyers and twelve
percent of law students, although they comprised nearly twenty-five
percent of the national population. 243 For Bok, an increased number
of minority lawyers ensures "greater public confidence in the fairness
and integrity of the legal profession.
244
The Compelling Need Reports buttressed the University of Michi-
gan's defense of its own admissions policies. In 2003, blacks consti-
tuted 6.7 percent of the students enrolled at the University of
Michigan Law School because it accepted over eighty percent of all
black applicants who scored at least 155 on the LSAT.245 Nationally,
in the fall of 2002, only 0.8 percent of black test takers scored the
median of 165 on the LSAT. In contrast, 8.3 percent of nonblack test
takers scored 165 or higher, a number large enough to fill the first-
year class at all of the nation's top law schools. 246 To achieve racial
diversity in enrollment, the University of Michigan Law School re-
237 BOWEN & BOK, supra note 201, at 5.
238 Id. at 7. To put this number in perspective, in the same year, the percentage of
black medical students was 6.3 percent. Id.
239 See Bok Expert Report, supra note 234, at 260.
240 Id.
241 See id. at 262.
242 See id.
241 Id. at 263 (citing DEBORAH L. RHODES, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 53-54 (1994)).
244 Id.
245 What if Grutter Had Gone the Other Way ?, J. BLcs HIGHER EDUC., Autumn 2003, at
32, 33.
246 Id. at 32-33. If the admissions process had not been race sensitive, "it is reasonable
to assume that students would [have] need[ed] an LSAT score in the range of 165 in order
to have a good chance to be considered for admission." Id.
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jected almost one-half of all white applicants who scored between 163
and 167 on the LSAT.2 47 Without some racial preference, black law
student enrollment at the University of Michigan Law School could
have been just two percent in 2003.248
VI
THE SUPREME COURT'S SPLIT DECISIONS IN THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN CASES
On June 23, 2003, the Supreme Court issued two majority opin-
ions in Grutter and Gratz that seemed to resolve the ambiguity created
by the lack of a clear and consistent majority among Bakke's six written
opinions. Since 1978, "admissions committees could never be sure
whether a majority of the Supreme Court had supported the argu-
ment that engineering a diverse freshman class was of compelling in-
terest to the state."249 Speaking for a 5-4 majority in Grutter, Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
reaffirmed Justice Powell's "tie-breaking vote"250 in Bakke that racial
diversity is a compelling state interest and that the strict scrutiny test
did not restrict race-based governmental policies to remedying past
discrimination. 25' The use of race was a permissible factor in the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School's admissions decisions as long as it was
part of a "highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file,
giving serious consideration to all the ways an applicant might contrib-
ute to a diverse educational environment."25 2 In Gratz, however, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the 6-3 majority, struck down a mech-
anistic system of giving twenty bonus points to minority undergradu-
ate applicants to the University of Michigan's College of Literature,
Science, and the Arts, because it operated like a quota.
253
In addition to holding that race may be considered in shaping a
remedy for past discrimination, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
recognized that race may also be used in an inclusive way to achieve
diversity that is beneficial to white and minority students alike.
2 54
However, Justice O'Connor's conception of the promotion of diversity
went beyond the beneficial interaction in the classroom emphasized
by Justice Powell. In holding that the University of Michigan Law
247 Id.
248 Id. at 33.
249 Jacques Steinberg, Supreme Court: University Admissions: An Admissions Guide, N.Y.
TiMES, June 24, 2003, at Al.
250 Id. at A23.
251 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (citing Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12, 362-63 (1978)).
252 Id. at 337.
253 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270-72 (2003).
254 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329-33.
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School's interest in a diverse student body was a compelling interest,
Justice O'Connor argued that the law school's system "promotes
'cross-racial understanding,' helps to break down racial stereotypes,
and 'enables [students] to better understand persons of different
races.'"255 Among the arguments as to why "cross-racial understand-
ing" is a compelling interest of the state, Justice O'Connor pointed
out its necessity for leadership legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.
Laws schools commonly train many of the nation's future leaders, and
"[i]n order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of
the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open
to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity."
256
In addition to holding that this understanding was a compelling
interest, the Grutter decision also defended academic freedom as long
as a university acts in good faith in establishing admissions criteria and
achieving educationally beneficial racial diversity. 257 Race must not
be used to infer inferiority or to play politics. Universities should not
admit minority students by separate admissions tracks (as with the
University of Texas Law School's policy, struck down in Hopwood) or
quotas (as with the University of California at Davis Medical School's
policy, struck down in Bakke). Additionally, Justice O'Connor ex-
pressed doubts that percentage plans or admission of top students by
class rank were "race neutral," in that they might indeed prevent indi-
vidual evaluations.2 58 Moreover, plans such as those in Texas, Califor-
nia, and Florida were of limited value in admitting students to
graduate and professional schools. 25 9 While endorsing a narrow ap-
plication of race in the law school admission case, Justice O'Connor
recognized the complex judgments involved in a university's admis-
sions policy. Such policies begin with a faculty committee drafting the
policy, which then must be unanimously approved by the school's
faculty.260 Evidently, the amici curiae briefs and the reports of Bowen
255 Id. at 330.
256 Id. at 332. Justice O'Connor, quoting from Brown v. Board of Education acknowl-
edged that 
" [ t ] 
his court had long recognized that 'education ... is the very foundation of
good citizenship."' Id. at 331. In The Evolving Language of Diversity and Integration in Discus-
sions of Affirmative Action from Bakke to Grutter, Jeffrey S. Lehman emphasized the Supreme
Court's use of "the government's argument" against "the Law School's policy" was "surpris-
ing." See PATRICIA GURIN ET AL., DEFENDING DivERsrrv. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT THE UNIVER-
SITY OF MICHIGAN 91 (2004). Lehman observed that "the majority instead used the
government's argument to extend the constitutional understanding of diversity to incorpo-
rate not only a pedagogic interest but also an interest in democratic legitimacy." Id. The Court
stated: "Effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of
our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized." Grutter,
539 U.S. at 332.
257 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329, 335.
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and Bok had considerable influence on Justice O'Connor's opinion
and her deference to carefully developed admissions policies. In his
dissent, however, Justice Scalia, focusing on implementation, raised
the issue of how to measure whether an admissions committee suffi-
ciently evaluated an applicant "as an individual.
'" 26 1
Grutter represents a victory not only for the University of Michi-
gan, but for other universities that give some weight to race in admit-
ting students, among other factors. Universities do not have to prove
that they are seeking to remedy past institutional discrimination,
rather only a broader "societal discrimination." Indeed, the decision
reaches even further. While Justice O'Connor expects "that 25 years
from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to
further the interest approved today,"262 the Supreme Court has indi-
cated that its reasoning is applicable to all institutions that accept fed-
eral money. Thus, private as well as public institutions may consider
race in seeking to promote racial understanding, with the goal of end-
ing the need for such consideration and striving to implement a race-
blind policy.
263
In Gratz, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion was supported by Jus-
tices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justices O'Connor and Breyer
wrote concurring opinions. The majority agreed that Michigan's un-
dergraduate admissions policy of awarding twenty out of a total of 150
points to minority applicants on the basis of race failed to meet the
constitutional strict scrutiny test, which requires proof that narrowly
tailored means are being employed to achieve a compelling state in-
terest in diversity.264 Consistent with Grutter, the Gratz majority re-
quired applications to be given "individualized review" so as to
determine what each might contribute to the overall diversity of the
first-year class.
265
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that because "[t]he stain
of generations of racial oppression is still visible in our society," 2 66 the
261 See id. at 348-49. Justices Scalia and Thomas were the only two Justices who re-
jected the majority view that a diverse student body creates educational benefits that are a
compelling interest. See id. at 395 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). They preferred overturning Bakke. Justice Kennedy agreed that race
might be taken into account as a factor in admissions, but disagreed with its use by the law
school because of a failure to apply strict scrutiny of the means used. .See id. at 387-88
(KennedyJ, dissenting); see also Ann D. Springer, Affirming Diversity at Michigan, AcADEME,
Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 54, 54-58.
262 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
263 See Springer, supra note 261, at 55.
264 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003).
265 See id. at 274. Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens wrote dissenting opinions. See
id. at 282 (StevensJ, dissenting); id. at 291 (SouterJ., dissenting); id. at 298 (Ginsburg,J.,
dissenting).
266 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
2005]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Constitution must be "'both color blind and color conscious.' , 267 It is
not unconstitutional, she reasoned, for colleges and universities to
seek to overcome the impact of the legacy of racial discrimination by
developing preferences to include African-American, Hispanic, and
Native-American students as long as such policies do not "unduly" im-
pede the admission chances of the white majority.26 8 Using the Uni-
versity of Michigan's overt point system to admit a critical number of
minority students was preferable, she argued, to resorting to "camou-
flage" or code words for family background, cultural heritage, and
community associations.269 "If honesty is the best policy," said Justice
Ginsburg, "surely Michigan's accurately described, fully disclosed Col-
lege affirmative action program is preferable to achieving similar
numbers through winks, nods, and disguises."
270
Ann Springer, associate counsel of the American Association of
University Professors (AAUP), analyzed the Supreme Court's rulings
in Grutter and Gralz and observed that these opinions left what types of
affirmative action plans are constitutionally acceptable "up in the
air."2 7 ' She complimented the Supreme Court's "strong endorse-
ment" of the freedom of educators to make academic decisions, in-
cluding decisions regarding affirmative action policies.272  Yet,
Springer faulted the Court for failing "to truly recognize systemic dis-
parities" by not acknowledging the extent of the privilege belonging
to members of the majority.273 Springer found a consensus between
the two majority decisions in that both Justice O'Connor and Chief
Justice Rehnquist seemed to agree that racial preferences were per-
missible if they are part of a "'highly individualized, holistic review of
each applicant's file.' ' 2 74 Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized, how-
ever, that the "means" be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
state interest, a condition he did not believe was met by the admis-
sions policies of either the law school or the undergraduate school.
275
Justice O'Connor argued that the law school factored in "many possi-
ble bases for diversity" and avoided the fixed percentages of a quota
267 Id. at 302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Jefferson County Bd.
of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966)).
268 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
26q Id. at 304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
270 Id. at 305 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For an analysis of the ways in which Justice
Ginsburg's dissent in Gratz echoes the reasoning of the Brown decision, see William J. Rich,
Betrayal of the Children with Dolls: The Broken Promise of Constitutional Protection for Victims of
Race Discrimination, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 419 (2005).
271 See Springer, supra note 261, at 57.
272 Id. at 56.
273 Id. at 58.
274 Id. at 56 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 344, 309 (2003)).
275 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 379 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
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system.2 76 She also recognized the need to admit "a critical mass" of
students from historically excluded ethnic and racial groups, but
noted that the law school admitted some non-minority applicants with
lower academic ratings than racial minority applicants because they
contributed to diversity on other grounds. 277 Neither Justice found
the undergraduate admissions point system acceptable.
2 78
Legal challenges to affirmative action from white students are ex-
pected to continue-even though, as Goodwin Liu has observed,
white students' greatest competitors for access to the most selective
colleges are other white students, some of whom are admitted with
lower scores than the students citing affirmative action as the reason
for their rejection. 279 If elite colleges did not engage in affirmative
action, most white applicants would increase their chances of admis-
sions by only one-fifth of a percent.28 0 Nevertheless, despite continu-
ing debates about the rulings in Grutter and Gratz, former Dartmouth
College president James 0. Freedman commented that the Supreme
Court had finally provided a viable "road map" for colleges and uni-




THE AFTERMATH: UNIVERSITIES CAUTIOUSLY CONTINUE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ADMISSIONS POLICIES
Less than a month after the Grutter and Gratz decisions, officials
from forty-eight leading private and public universities attended a
conference sponsored by Harvard University's Civil Rights Project and
the University of Michigan to discuss their admissions policies in light
of the Supreme Court rulings. 28 2 At the conference, university offi-
cials discussed which minority recruiting procedures were permissible
under Bakke, Gratz, and Grutter.28 3 The participants acknowledged
that affirmative action remained vulnerable to both political and judi-
276 Springer, supra note 261, at 56-57.
277 Id. at 56.
278 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275, 280 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Springer, supra note 261,
at 55.
279 Liu, supra note 107, at 422-23; see also Goodwin Liu, Essay, The Myth and Math of
Affirmative Action, WASH. PosT, Apr. 14, 2002, at BI, B4 (adapted from Liu, supra note 104,
at 1046-50, 1103-04).
280 Liu, supra note 279, at Bi. Liu viewed the majority opinion in Grutteras reaffirming
the Brown decision. See Goodwin Liu, Down the road from U-M, A Remarkable Step for America,
HOLLAND SENTINEL, June 30, 2003, available at http://www.thehollandsentinel.net/stories/
063003/opi_063003019.shtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
281 Steinberg, supra note 249, at Al.
282 See Patrick Healy, College Leaders Share Affirmative Action Ideas at Harvard, BosroN




cial challenges and that achieving Justice O'Connor's challenge of im-
plementing race-blind admissions in twenty-five years would require
broad institutional and social changes.
2 84
Highly selective private universities are skillful, however, in distin-
guishing their affirmative action programs from those practiced by
large public universities with vast numbers of applicants. 28 5 By
recruiting academically qualified minority students through mailings
and school visits, Ivy League institutions can count factors other than
grades and SAT scores, and do not need quotas or reserved places for
minority students.286 Flexibility in evaluating "merit" is essential, since
it is difficult to measure which eighteen-year-old students are likely to
achieve the greatest success in life. 28 7 Well-staffed admissions offices
consider both the individuality of each applicant and the mix of stu-
dents from diverse backgrounds. 288 Among the factors to which pri-
vate universities give extra weight or "pluses" are outstanding personal
talents, race, unusual work or service experience, leadership, maturity,
compassion, ability to overcome disadvantages, and ability to interact
with others from diverse backgrounds. 289 Because elite private univer-
sities have the resources to evaluate applicants holistically, courts will
likely accord such universities the freedom to exercise considerable
discretion in reviewing their applicants.
Moreover, very few rejected applicants could bring a legal chal-
lenge against the Ivy League and other selective colleges because, as
Justice Ginsburg recognized in her dissent in Gratz, sophisticated ad-
missions officers avoid point systems, thereby shielding the process
from scrutiny.290 Another deterrent is the vast financial resources and
influential alumni of elite private institutions, a number of whom are
prominent attorneys. 29 1 Although for the first time the Supreme
Court indicated that its rulings applied to "every institution that ac-
cepts any federal money," the current Justices-with the possible ex-
ception of Justices Scalia and Thomas-probably lack the desire to
treat private institutions as state actors strictly subjected to the Four-
284 See id.
285 See David Czuchlewski, Court Rulings Prompt University to Assess Affirmative Action Pol-
icy, DAILY PRINCFTONIAN, Apr. 16, 1996, at I (suggesting that Princeton was not worried
about the legal impact of potential Supreme Court cases on its affirmative action program,
but that the university might change its policy to reflect an updated societal view of affirma-
tive action).
286 Id. at 7.
287 Id. at 7-8.
288 Id. at 7.
289 Id. at 5, 7.
290 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 304 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
291 Theodore Cross, Why the Opponents of Racial Preferences Haven't Taken America's Pri-
vote Universities to Court, J. BLAcKs HIGHER Educ., Summer 1999, at 106-10.
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teenth Amendment's equal protection clause and Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act.
292
Since Grutter and Gratz, enrollment of African-American students
has held steady or improved at universities with affirmative action poli-
cies.2 9 3 As of the fall of 2003, the eight highest-ranked universities,
not including the Ivy League, with the largest enrollments of black
undergraduates were: UNC-Chapel Hill (11.1 percent), Duke Univer-
sity (10.4 percent), Emory University (9.3 percent), Stanford Univer-
sity (8.8 percent), Tulane University (8.8 percent), University of
Virginia (8.7 percent), Washington University (8.4 percent), and the
University of Florida (8.3 percent).294 Among the Ivy League,
Princeton enrolled the highest percentage of black undergraduates
(8.2 percent), followed by Yale (7.9 percent), Columbia (7.0 percent),
the University of Pennsylvania (6.6 percent), Harvard (6.4 percent),
Dartmouth (6.1 percent), Brown (5.9 percent), and Cornell (4.7 per-
cent). 295 In 2003, the University of Michigan's undergraduate student
body was 8.1 percent black.
296
After the Supreme Court struck down its system of awarding
points to minority undergraduate applicants, President Mary Sue
Coleman wanted the University of Michigan to emphasize a broader
concept of "diverse diversity" that moved beyond racial differences to
include socioeconomic status, family background, and personal char-
acteristics. 29 7 The university drafted a new, eighteen-page application
form that asked personal questions such as whether the applicant's
parents and grandparents attended college and whether the applicant
helped to support his or her family.29 8 Only about twenty percent of
the university's 25,000 undergraduates came from a family whose in-
come was under $50,000.299 President Coleman, whose own father
had been born in Kentucky's coal mining region, wanted to recruit
students from similar roots.3 00 She stated that a "student from the
hills of Kentucky would be quite interesting and different [at the Uni-
versity of Michigan] .,,301 The new diversity at the University of Michi-
gan emphasized cultural and socio-economic factors as well as race.
292 Id. at 107; see Springer, supra note 261, at 55.
293 Leaders and Laggards: Rankings of Black Enrollments at the Nation's 50 Highest-Ranked












As a result of Grutter, on November 24, 2003, Rice University and
the University of Texas announced plans to include ethnicity and race
among the factors in admissions decisions.30 2 Rice University planned
to implement the policy in the fall of 2004 because the "race-neutral
means" applied since 1996 had not "yielded the level of diversity, in-
cluding racial and ethnic diversity, to achieve Rice's educational
goals."30 3 According to University of Texas President Larry Faulkner,
since diversity is "central to this university's primary mission of educat-
ing leaders for the future," it would include a racial factor in the fall of
2005, while keeping its top ten percent rule that admitted seventy per-
cent of the freshmen in 2003.304
Small increases in minority freshmen enrollment occurred in the
fall of 2004 at the University of Texas at Austin and at Texas A&M. 30 5
Though Texas A&M could have reinstated affirmative action after
Grutter overturned Hopwood, instead it decided to end affirmative ac-
tion in December 2003.306 Then, in January 2004, the university abol-
ished preferential admissions for children of alumni, thus appeasing
the Texas legislators, congressmen, and various community groups,
who had denounced the university's decision to end its affirmative ac-
tion program. 30 7 President Robert M. Gates stated that, in addition to
more vigorous recruiting efforts in minority areas, the university
would promote diversity by weighing criteria such as life experiences,
hardships, and leadership qualities.3 05 Those efforts paid off. In the
fall of 2004, Texas A&M admitted 277 more minority freshmen and
114 fewer whites.
30 9
In Georgia, which is twenty-nine percent African-American, af-
firmative action ended at public universities in 2001 after the Eleventh
Circuit ruled it unconstitutional for the University of Georgia to award
bonus points in admissions decisions and race-based scholarships. 310
As a result, the percentage of black students at the University of Geor-
302 Todd Acker-man, Texas Colleges Use Race in Admissions: Rice, University of Texas to Use
Ethnicity as Factor in Fall 2004, ANN ARBOR NEws, Nov. 25, 2003, at A4.
303 Id.
304 Id.; see Cyndee-Nga Trinh & Tessa Moll, Race-Based Admission Decisions Pass First-Year
Mark, DAILY TEXAN, June 23, 2004, at 1.
305 Victoria Rossi & Hallie Pratt, Minority Enrollment Sees Small Jump, DAILY TEXAN, Sept.
24, 2004, at 1.
306 See Greg Winter, Texas A&M Ban on "Legacies"Fuels Debate on Admissions, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 13, 2004, at A16.
307 Id. In 2002 and 2003, Texas A&M admitted over 300 white students largely because
of their alumni connections, a number nearly equal to the black students admitted in the
same years. Id.
308 Id.
309 Rossi & Pratt, supra note 305, at 1.
310 Johnson v. Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (l1th Cir. 2001).
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gia dropped to 5.5 percent from the 6.2 percent it had been in
1988.311
In California, on the other hand, minority applications began to
rise at some state institutions, although they had declined system wide
as a result of Proposition 209.312 By the fall of 2003, the acceptance
rate among blacks at the University of California at Berkeley was 18.9
percent, compared to an overall acceptance rate of 23.9 percent, and
black students constituted 4.1 percent of the freshman class. 3 13 The
University of California at Los Angeles accepted black students at a
rate of 18.3 percent, compared to an overall acceptance rate of 24.1
percent, and black students comprised 4.0 percent of the first-year
class. 3 14 As of June 2004, however, only ninety-eight African Ameri-
cans had registered for the incoming first-year class-only 2.5 percent
of the projected 3,821 students. 3 15
Cost is also a factor in designing and implementing minority
recruiting programs. While many colleges and universities seem com-
mitted to preferring race as one of several factors in admissions deci-
sions, implementing "holistic review" may require a costly expansion
of admissions staff.3 16 In addition, some colleges and universities have
either cancelled or opened to white students their summer and orien-
tation programs and financial aid packages that were previously aimed
at assisting minority students. 3 17 Moreover, universities are under
pressure to refocus the concept of diversity to address "race-neutral"
economic issues that prevent many students from applying to four-
year residential institutions.
3 1 8
In fact, economic status, as much as race, has continued to deter-
mine access to higher education. As the federal government cuts back
on its financial aid to students and states reduce their funding for
public colleges and universities-which educate some eighty percent
311 Affirmative Action Ban Hinders UGA, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 6, 2003, available at
http://www.sptimes.com/2OO3/06/06worIdandnation/AfflrmativeAction_ba.shtml (last
visited Nov. 16, 2004); Nina Brook, College Admissions Need Continued Benefit of Affirmative
Action, STATE (Columbia, S.C.), June 30, 2003, at Al2.
312 Ethan Bonner, Black and Hispanic Admissions Off Sharply at U. of California, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 1998, at Al; William H. Honan, Minority Applications Rise at California, Easing
Fears, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1998, at A20.
313 Table on Admission of African Americans at the Highest-Ranked Universities, J. BLAcKs
HIGHER EDUC., Autumn 2003, at 8.
314 Id.
315 Ronald Cruz, Chancellor Must Boost Minority Enrollment, DAILY CALIFORNIAN, Aug. 31,
2004, at http://www.dailycal.org/article.php?id=15909 (last visited Nov. 16, 2004);
Michelle Locke, Enrollment of Blacks at Berkeley Dropping, BosToN GLOBE, June 4, 2004, at A3.
316 Wendy McElroy, Affirmation Action on Decline, at http://www.enterstageright.com/
archive/articles/0704/0704aadec.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
317 Justin Pope, Colleges Still Cautious About Affirmative Action, STATE (Columbia, SC),




of students-lower-income Americans will find it increasingly difficult
to educate their children.3 19 Since 2001, twenty-seven states have re-
duced their higher education appropriations, forcing four-year public
colleges and universities to raise tuition fees to an average of $10,636
per year-an increase of eighty-five percent in a decade.320 Even as
families in the middle- and upper-middle income ranges absorb the
higher tuitions, the poorest families are not able to absorb these tui-
tion costs, which have risen from sixty-four percent of their 1993 in-
come to seventy-one percent in 2001.321 The Pell Grant, which
initially paid eighty-four percent of a public four-year institution's ex-
penses for students whose families earned less than $15,000 a year,
now pays only thirty-nine percent, or $4,050 a year.32 2 At the same
time, public institutions have sought to enroll more tuition-reduced
"merit" students and to recruit additional tuition-paying out-of-state
students.3 2 3 As one journalist describes, "the cost crisis is resegregat-
ing higher education, not by color but by class." 324 In 1973, "40.5 per-
cent of the students receiving Pell grants for the needy attended four-
year public schools," but only 31 percent of recipients attended such
schools in 2001.325 Economic status also affects the age at which stu-
dents receive a degree. Whereas about 51.4 percent of children from
families earning more than $85,000 a year have a college degree by
their twenty-fourth birthday, only 4.5 percent of children from fami-
lies earning under $35,000 can say the same.
326
To assist students from low-income families of all races, the Uni-
versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill announced in September
2003 that its Carolina Covenant program would provide tuition grants
to pay all expenses of students from families at or below 150 percent
of the federal poverty level. 32 7 In exchange for working ten to twelve
hours a week at a campus job, the students are able to graduate with-
out debt.3 28 Since the family assets of black students in the state, some
1,750 of whom attend UNC, are, on average, only 10 percent that of
white family assets, black students will likely receive a larger percent-
age of the benefits from this program.
329
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Recently, Ivy League colleges have also adopted need-blind ad-
missions and increased student financial aid to help students pay tui-
tion costs that have soared to between $30,000 and $40,000 per year.
For example, in response to its need-blind policy adopted for the class
of 2007, Brown University received a higher number of applications
from students of color and from lower-income families than it previ-
ously had.330 From a pool of 15,153 applicants, Brown accepted al-
most 2,300 (about fifteen percent) for 1,400 places, thirty-five percent
of whom were minorities. Asian Americans were the largest group
(sixteen percent), followed by African Americans (ten percent), La-
tino Americans (nine percent), and Native Americans (under one
percent).331 About sixteen percent did not identify ethnicity, which
may augur a future trend.332 Alumni children held steady at seven
percent.333 Harvard has also expanded its total undergraduate aid
program to just under $110 million in 2003-04 and reduced the aver-
age amount of debt of graduates to $8,800. 334 Its undergraduate
scholarship budget will be increased to almost $80 million. 335 The
new financial package offered to students entering the class of 2008
resulted in almost an eighty percent yield among those from low or
medium income families. 336 In his address to the American Council
on Education, Harvard University President Lawrence H. Summers
stated that Harvard would no longer require a contribution from par-
ents who earned under $40,000 per year and would reduce the
amount for parents earning between $40,000 and $60,000.33 7 None-
theless, the average family income of scholarship recipients was
$88,000.
339
Harvard's aggressive recruiting of qualified ethnic and racial mi-
nority students achieved increased diversification in the class of 2008
as compared to the class of 2007: 19.7 percent Asian-American stu-
dents (eighteen percent for the class of 2007); 9.2 percent African-
American students (8.8 percent for 2007); 8.9 percent Latino students
(eight percent for 2007); and 1.1 percent Native Americans (0.8 per-
330 Kristen Cole, Acceptance Letters Go Out to Class of 2007, Mar. 31, 2003, available at
http://www.brown.edu/Administration/George-Streetjournal/vol27/2 7 GSJ23a.html
(last visited Nov. 16, 2004); Twelve-Year Enrollment Trendst for Black Freshmen at Ivy League




334 Harvard Announces New Initiative Aimed at Economic Barriers to College,
Harvard University Office of News and Public Affairs, Feb. 28, 2004, at http://
www.news.harvard.edu/press/pressdoc/pr-040227-econ.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2004).
3 Id.
336 College's New Financial Aid Initiative Keeps Yield Near 80%, HARV. UNIV. GAZETrE, May





cent for 2007) .19 Nevertheless, the mixed message about affirmative
action under Bakke and Grutter may be found in a comment by Henry
Louis GatesJr., chair of Harvard's African and African American Stud-
ies Department: "The black kids who come to Harvard or Yale are
middle class. Nobody else gets through."
3 40
Looking back at Grutter, William G. Bowen acknowledged that
colleges and universities had "dodged" the bullet that might have
barred all consideration of race in admissions decisions.34' However,
Bowen emphasized that the persistent "preparation gap" among mi-
nority students will continue to affect their academic performance.
342
As a result, no one should assume "that the need for race-sensitive
admissions will end within 25 years simply as a result of trends and
policies already in place."3 43 Bowen urged "the most 'privileged' col-
leges and universities to consider moving beyond 'need-blind' admis-
sions and giving a positive boost to the admissions chances of well-
qualified candidates from poor families and from families with no col-
lege-going history."344 Such a boost would be equivalent to "putting a
'legacy thumb' on the scale" or even "substituting some of these candi-
dates for recruited athletes." 345 The nation's "'unlovely racial his-
tory'" remains a burden on all Americans, 346 requiring consideration
"of race, in sensible ways," even as "we work to reduce the need for
racial preferences."3 47 The promise of Grutter, as the promise of Brown
and Bakke before it, is to "sustain 'a culture of hope,"' in which "pos-
sibilities and dreams" are without limit.
348
339 Id.; see also Marcia G. Synnott, Affirmative Action at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, 1960s
to 2000 (paper presented at a panel on University Admissions Policies and the Supreme
Court: From Desegregation to Affirmative Action to the End of Racial Preferences at the
Organization of American Historians, Mar. 27, 2004) (on file with author).
340 Pell Grant Count Puts Most Ivy League SchooLs Near the Bottom in Percentage of Low-Income
Students, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Autumn 2003, at 122.
341 William G. Bowen, Grutter: Where Do We Go From Here?: The Impact of the Supreme
Court Decisions in the University of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases, J. BLAcKS HIGHER EDUC.,
Summer 2004, at 76.
142 Id. at 79 (italics omitted).
343 Id.
344 Id. at 80.
345 Id.
346 Id.
347 Id. at 81.
348 Id.
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